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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WORKPLACE HARASSMENT IN THE ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT
ROBERT J. TEPPER* AND CRAIG G. WHITE**
ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, claims of workplace harassment have received
greater attention.1 Sometimes called “workplace bullying,” such harassment is
commonly defined as behavior by a perpetrator that may involve repeated
verbal abuse, offensive conduct that may threaten, humiliate, or intimidate a
target, or efforts to sabotage a target’s performance.2 As commonly defined,
the subject behavior is intentional, results in physical or psychological harm to
the target, and makes the target’s job performance more difficult.3 At times,
perpetrators, who may include administrators and faculty members, combine
their efforts to abuse and harass the target, a phenomenon known as
“mobbing.”4 Both federal and state statutory law currently provide remedies

* C.P.A., M.B.A., J.D.; Lecturer in the Accounting Department, University of New Mexico,
Anderson School of Management. Presented by the authors at the 2010 Annual Conference of
the American Accounting Association - Southwest Region, Dallas, Texas, March 6, 2010.
** C.P.A., Ph.D.; Chair of the Accounting Department; Moss Adams Professor of Accounting,
University of New Mexico, Anderson School of Management.
1. See David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American Employment Law: A Ten-Year
Progress Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251, 251–53 (2010).
2. Definition of Workplace Bullying, WORKPLACE BULLYING INST., http://www.workplace
bullying.org/individuals/problem/definition (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
3. Michael E. Chaplin, Workplace Bullying: The Problem and the Cure, 12 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 437, 445 (2010); Katherine Lippel, The Law of Workplace Bullying: An International
Overview, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 2–3 (2010) (contrasting the scholarly definition of
workplace bullying, which addresses frequency and duration of negative behavior and excludes
isolated events or equal strength interactions, with the lay definition of bullying as negative
behavior that harms the target).
4. Audrey Williams June, ‘Mobbing’ Can Damage More Than Careers, Professors Are
Told at Conference, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (June 11, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/
Mobbing-Can-Damage-More-Than/47736/. The distinction between bullying and mobbing has
been explained:
Workplace mobbing is like bullying, in that the object is to rob the target of dignity and
self-respect. Here, however, it is not a single swaggering bully that the target is up
against, but the juggernaut of collective will. The message to the target is that everybody
wants you out of here. Bullies often play leading roles in mobbing cases, whether as
targets or perpetrators.
81
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for such behavior where it is motivated by discriminatory animus and the
target is a member of a protected class (such as gender or national origin).5
But no U.S. jurisdiction currently recognizes a cause of action against this sort
of behavior when it is not linked to discrimination—in contrast to several
European countries that provide remedies for workplace bullying untethered to
discriminatory animus. Even though legislation to provide a remedy for such
behavior has been introduced in several states, it has not been enacted, and it is
often accompanied by strong opposition from employer interests.6 Courts have
likewise been reluctant to expand the law to accommodate such claims.7

Kenneth Westhues, Summary for the Workplace Mobbing Conference (Waterloo Anti-Mobbing
Instruments, Novotel, Brisbane), Oct. 14–15, 2004, at 1, available at http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/
~kwesthue/wami.pdf. Thus, mobbing is group harassment, “a process of abusive behaviors
inflicted over time.” Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 2009). Despite the original
distinction between workplace bullying and mobbing, the two terms often are used
interchangeably. Jordan F. Kaplan, Help Is on the Way: A Recent Case Sheds Light on
Workplace Bullying, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 141, 144 (2010).
5. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); Alex Long,
State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans With Disabilities Act, 65
U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 601 (2004).
6. For example, the Society for Human Resource Management reportedly opposed such
legislation in New York on the grounds that it is generally “bad for business” and specifically that
(1) human resource professionals are dedicated advocates for employees; (2) employers have
adequate incentives to combat workplace harassment because it affects the health and morale of
the workforce (as well as the image and profitability of the employers); (3) employers have
studied the issue and many have codes of conduct and dispute resolution mechanisms to address
it; and (4) such legislation would undermine existing efforts to combat the problem, strain
employer-employee relationships, and increase the cost of doing business―given that employers
will be called upon to defend frivolous lawsuits from unscrupulous employees or incur liability
for lost wages, medical expenses, emotional distress, punitive damages and attorney’s fees. See
G. Namie, SHRM Opposes Anti-Bullying Healthy Workplace Bill, HEALTHY WORKPLACE BILL
(June 18, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://healthyworkplacebill.org/blog/?p=144.
7. See Thomas v. N. Telecom, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 627, 635 (M.D. N.C. 2000) (noting
that workplace conduct rarely supports a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”)); see also Crocker v. Griffin, No. COA09-1000, 2010 WL 1961258, at *4–5 (N.C. Ct.
App. May 18, 2010) (action brought by four former employees listing twenty-eight acts of
supervisor involving “yelling, shouting, or saying insulting or demeaning things” did not state an
IIED claim). One court has affirmed a verdict in favor of a plaintiff on an assault theory while
allowing an expert witness to testify as to the presence of workplace bullying. Raess v. Doescher,
883 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Ind. 2008). No one rationale completely supports the result in the case.
The panel majority determined that the plaintiff failed to properly object to the expert’s testimony
on workplace bullying and therefore any error was forfeited. Id. at 797. It further determined
that that the phrase “workplace bullying” was a general descriptive term that could be a form of
IIED. Id. at 799. Another member of the panel majority found the plaintiff’s objection sufficient,
but any error in admissibility harmless because the expert’s testimony went to the merits of an
IIED claim which the jury rejected. Id. (Sullivan, J., concurring in result). A dissenting member
of the panel determined that the objection had been preserved, and that the testimony concerning
workplace bullying was erroneous and not harmless. Id. at 801–02 (Boehm, J., dissenting).
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This Article discusses the development of harassment claims that might be
pursued in a judicial forum, with an emphasis in the academic context. It
suggests that special characteristics, including a decentralized environment, a
focus on academic pursuits, and a hierarchical intellectual environment, may
allow such behaviors to go unchecked at an academic institution.8 At the same
time, it cautions that categorizing behavior as workplace bullying is necessarily
a nuanced determination and that, therefore, any statutory or administrative
measures must take care to protect academic freedom. The free exchange of
ideas in teaching and research (and faculty and departmental governance) bears
the potential at all times to offend powerful and not-so-powerful internal and
external interests alike. Accordingly, any measure designed to deal with
workplace bullying must recognize this concern and preserve intellectual and
creative discourse. That said, like discrimination, behavior that takes the form
of harassment or bullying simply has no place on a college campus. Thus, this
Article urges academic institutions to raise awareness of workplace harassment
and suggests remedial mechanisms to counteract and prevent this problem.
INTRODUCTION
Generally, “workplace bullying” is defined as the “intentional infliction of
a hostile work environment upon an employee by a coworker or coworkers,
typically through a combination of verbal and nonverbal behaviors.”9 A
popular website on workplace bullying explains that workplace bullying
manifests in a variety of ways, including verbal abuse, interference with work,
or persistent conduct that threatens, humiliates, or intimidates.10 Such
harassment may involve a single perpetrator or a group.11 It is usually typified
by repeated negative acts intended to oppress or annoy the target. It results in
physical or psychological harm to the target and interferes with job
performance. A 2010 survey indicates that thirty-five percent (thirty-seven
percent in 2007) of American workers have been targets of workplace
bullying; nine percent currently are targets.12 Workplace bullying is four times
more prevalent than workplace discrimination, which is prohibited by law.13
Several researchers have sought to identify the characteristics of workplace
bullies, their typical targets, and the factors that contribute to workplace

8. See Piper Fogg, Academic Bullies, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 12, 2008, at B10.
9. David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for StatusBlind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 481 (2000).
10. Definition of Workplace Bullying, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. WORKPLACE BULLYING INST., 2010 U.S. WORKPLACE BULLYING SURVEY (2010),
available
at
http://workplacebullying.org/research/2010NatlSurvey/2010_Survey_Flyer.pdf
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 BULLYING SURVEY].
13. Id.
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bullying. One commentator attributes the increasing frequency of workplace
bullying in America to “the growth of the service-sector economy, the global
profit squeeze, the decline of unionization, the diversification of the workforce,
and increased reliance on contingent workers.”14 Furthermore, in addition to
identifying factors that contribute to workplace bullying, at least three common
traits of the workplace bully have been identified.15 First, bullies in the
workplace are generally men in supervisory or senior roles relative to their
targets—a recent study suggests the breakdown is sixty-two percent men and
thirty-eight percent women.16 Second, their goal is to limit or sabotage their
targets’ “ability to succeed” at work.17 Third, motivated by their “own feelings
of inadequacy,” bullies look to target “agreeable, vulnerable, and successful
coworkers.”18 Same-gender bullying is more prevalent (sixty-eight percent);
women bullies target women eighty percent of the time.19
Why would a university tolerate a bully? The obvious answer might be
that the university is unaware of the problem. Another might be that bullies
are perceived as adding value, particularly in departments that harbor conflict
and are hyper-competitive.20 After all, aggressive and underhanded behavior is
frequently portrayed as desirable in popular culture. Still another might be that
the university simply views the problem as insignificant (or perhaps as one of
deference to management prerogative or the rights of the perpetrator). The
likelihood of a targeted employee obtaining relief under existing law is quite
limited, so the incentive to take action may be low.
I. CURRENT CASE LAW
There is very little case law in the United States discussing workplace
bullying. In 2008, the Indiana Supreme Court decided Raess v. Doescher, a
case that considered the concept of “workplace bullying.”21 The court

14. Yamada, supra note 9, at 486; see also David C. Yamada, Employment Law as if People
Mattered: Bringing Therapeutic Jurisprudence into the Workplace, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV.
257, 258–59 (2010) [hereinafter Therapeutic Jurisprudence] (suggesting that a “markets and
management” mentality has dominated American employment law and may be responsible for
prevalence of abusive behaviors like workplace bullying).
15. See Yamada, supra note 9, at 482–83.
16. 2010 BULLYING SURVEY, supra note 12; Yamada, supra note 9, at 482–83.
17. Yamada, supra note 9, at 483.
18. Id. On this point, it is important to note that workplace bullying, at least in the
theoretical context, involves how the victim felt, not what the perpetrator intended. DARLA J.
TWALE & BARBARA M. DE LUCA, FACULTY INCIVILITY: THE RISE OF THE ACADEMIC BULLY
CULTURE AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 27 (2008).
19. 2010 BULLYING SURVEY, supra note 12.
20. Chaplin, supra note 3, at 442; see ROBERT I. SUTTON, THE NO ASSHOLE RULE 55–56
(2007).
21. Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 799 (Ind. 2008).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011]

WORKPLACE HARASSMENT IN THE ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT

85

discussed “workplace bullying” in the context of expert testimony and a
tendered jury instruction, although it did not have occasion to discuss
workplace bullying as a cause of action.22 In that case, the employee (Mr.
Doescher), filed suit against a cardiovascular surgeon (Dr. Raess), after a
verbal altercation that took place at an Indiana hospital.23 The employee
“sought compensatory and punitive damages for assault, intentional infliction
of emotional distress [(“IIED”)], and tortious interference with employment.”24
Despite the surgeon’s objections, the employee relied on the expert testimony
of Dr. Gary Namie of the Workplace Bullying Institute to characterize the
surgeon as a bully and to label the incident as one of workplace bullying.25
Only the assault and IIED claims went to the jury, which in a split verdict
awarded the employee $325,000 in compensatory damages on the assault claim
and found in favor of the surgeon on the IIED claim.26
On direct appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the trial court
abused its discretion in (a) allowing Dr. Namie to testify that the surgeon was a
workplace bully, and (b) not instructing that workplace bullying was not an
issue in the case.27 The employee sought review of the court of appeals’s
decision. In reversing the court of appeals, the Indiana Supreme Court did not
have occasion to decide whether “workplace bullying” presented a legal cause
of action, but concluded that “workplace bullying” as a “general term[] used to
characterize a person’s behavior, is an entirely appropriate consideration in
determining . . . issues before the jury.”28 The court noted that even though
“workplace bullying” was not an element of the assault claim or IIED claim,
and even though the employee did not prevail on the IIED claim, “workplace
bullying could be considered a form of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”29 According to the court, “workplace bullying” is a general term
used to characterize a person’s behavior so it was relevant to the claims.30
Moreover, a witness who was both a clinical psychologist and
neuropsychologist, diagnosed the employee with post-traumatic stress disorder

22. Id. at 795–98.
23. Id. at 793. The court of appeals decision provides context; before the altercation, the
doctor had been concerned about perfusionist staffing and coverage issues. Id. at 794.
24. Id. at 793.
25. Id. at 795–96.
26. Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 793.
27. Raess v. Doescher, 858 N.E.2d 119, 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d on reh’g, 861 N.E.2d
1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d, 883 N.E.2d 790 (Ind. 2008) (emphasis added).
28. Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 799.
29. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A concurring opinion concluded
that Dr. Namie’s testimony only pertained to the IIED claim. Id. (Sullivan, J., concurring in
result). The conclusion that workplace bullying could be a form of IIED is supported by the few
cases which have found in favor of employees on IIED claims based upon such conduct.
30. Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 799.
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and paranoid thinking, and testified that such reactions were typical of persons
bullied in the workplace.31 The Indiana Supreme Court did not need to address
the issue of the admissibility of Dr. Namie’s testimony given its holding of the
lack of an adequate contemporaneous objection,32 but assuming an adequate
objection, one member of the court would have found harmless error in
admitting the testimony33 and another would have reversed based upon
prejudice.34 The dissenting opinion echoes the concerns of the court of
appeals: the testimony was of minimal probative value given the single
incident and amounted to name-calling unhelpful to the jury because Dr.
Namie was not qualified to say how the surgeon’s behavior affected the
plaintiff.35 The opinions of the court of appeals and the supreme court are
instructive because they demonstrate the issues that would confront any court
considering workplace bullying: what are the elements of any such tort, how
relevant is such evidence to existing torts, how should a trial court properly
balance the admission of such evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice
given the available proof, and the like.
Another case demonstrates facts suggestive of workplace bullying, though
the term is never used. In Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc.,
the employee sought to recover from the employer and a supervisor on claims
of prima facie tort, the tort of outrage, and IIED arising out of the supervisor’s
conduct.36 Specifically, the employee alleged that her supervisor had engaged
in conduct that caused severe mental harm, which resulted in her
hospitalization in a mental health facility.37 To support her claim, the
employee relied on evidence that she received harsh criticism from the
supervisor and was required to retype a memo on office procedure three times
(aimed at an error she committed at the supervisor’s direction).38 The
employee was forced to delay her vacation when the supervisor refused to sign
31. Id. at 801–02 (Boehm, J., dissenting).
32. Although Dr. Raess claimed that he “repeatedly objected” to Dr. Namie’s testimony at
trial, the court held that his trial objections did not preserve his argument on appeal because he
asserted a different argument on appeal. Id. at 796. On appeal, Dr. Raess argued that the trial
court erred in allowing Dr. Namie to testify as an expert because he was not qualified under
Indiana Rule of Evidence 702 to give scientific expert testimony. Id. The court explained,
however, that “[a]t no time during his trial objections did [Dr. Raess] claim that the subject matter
of Dr. Namie’s testimony lacked scientific reliability.” Id. at 797. Because “an objection on
grounds other than those raised on appeal, is ineffective to preserve an issue for appellate
review,” the court concluded that Dr. Raess’s appellate argument was barred by procedural
default. Id.
33. Id. at 799 (Sullivan, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 801 (Boehm, J., dissenting).
35. Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 801 (Boehm, J., dissenting).
36. Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P.2d 1376, 1379 (N.M. 1994).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 1378–79.
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a leave slip, only to appear at work and find that he had made arrangements for
a substitute (while expressing surprise at her appearance).39 The employee’s
claims for IIED and outrage were dismissed; however, on her claim of prima
facie tort, the court instructed the jury that the plaintiff must show
that Defendants performed one or more intentional, lawful acts; that
Defendants intended that the act or acts would cause harm to Plaintiff or knew
with certainty that harm would necessarily result; that the acts did in fact
proximately cause harm; and that Defendants’ conduct was not justifiable
40
under the circumstances.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee, awarding her $76,000.41
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed, holding that New
Mexico’s judicial recognition of prima facie tort was not retroactive and the
events in question preceded that recognition.42 The employee sought review,
and the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of
appeals and remanded on the retroactivity issue, specifically noting that it was
not passing on the sufficiency of the evidence regarding intent to harm or lack
of justification.43 Although the supreme court did not pass on the merits of the
employee’s claim, it is obvious that claims for workplace harassment are not
new and may fit under other federal and state theories, including denial of
equal protection,44 prima facie tort, assault, workers’ compensation, and the
like.
II. THE U.S. APPROACH
The American judicial system has been reluctant to recognize a cause of
action for workplace bullying, tending to approach the problem as a “human
resources” issue within the workplace.45 Instead, employment law in the
United States has focused more on providing a remedy for, and avoiding,
discriminatory practices “against historically disempowered people” in the job
market.46 For example, federal employment law (Title VII) prohibits

39. Id. at 1379.
40. Id. at 1379–80.
41. Beavers, 881 P.2d at 1380.
42. Id. (citing Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 859 P.2d 497, 498 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1993)).
43. Id. at 1378 n.2.
44. A state may not “omit altogether or give a diminished form of legal protection from
verbal or physical assaults to individuals in certain disfavored classes.” Schroeder v. Hamilton
Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (teacher claimed that
school district denied him equal protection by treating his complaints of harassment differently
than non-homosexual teachers).
45. Yamada, supra note 9, at 492.
46. Amanda E. Lueders, Note, You’ll Need More Than a Voltage Converter: Plugging
European Workplace Bullying Laws into the American Jurisprudential Outlet, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L
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employers from discriminating in the terms and conditions of employment
based upon “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”47 The Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits workplace “discriminat[ion] against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability”48 just as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits such “discriminat[ion]
against any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.”49 As a result of
these statutory provisions, a showing of “status-based harassment or
discrimination” must be made to establish entitlement to a legal remedy.50 No
matter how clear the harassment, it must be attributed in whole or in part to
disparate treatment based upon gender or some other protected category.51
Thus, cases are replete with employers claiming an “equal opportunity
harassment” defense because the perpetrator targeted those within and without

& COMP. L. 197, 202–03 (2008); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975)
(noting goal of Title VII was to provide equal employment opportunities and remove barriers to
employment for protected classes as well as to make victims of employment discrimination
whole).
47. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006).
50. Yamada, supra note 9, at 536; Yamada, supra note 1, at 258. These Acts also prohibit
retaliation for reporting discrimination or engaging in activity opposed to discrimination. 29
U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (Title VII); Crawford v. Metro.
Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850–52 (2009) (construing § 2000e-3(a));
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (construing § 2000e-3(a)).
51. In Pappas v. J.S.B. Holdings, Inc., the employee complained of workplace bullying and
harassment. 392 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1100 (D. Ariz. 2005). In determining whether her claim for
hostile work environment sexual harassment could survive summary judgment, the court stated:
That the evidence of record can support a finding that [she] was repeatedly subjected to
discourteous, boorish, mean-spirited treatment by certain of her co-workers that resulted
in an acrimonious and frustrating work situation for her cannot be reasonably disputed.
The issue is, however, whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to create a triable
issue as to whether [she] was in some manner subjected to discrimination based on sex.
Id. at 1104. This requirement significantly limits the utility of Title VII to combat general
workplace harassment. See Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“While [the plaintiff] may have been subject to intimidation, ridicule, and mistreatment, he has
not shown that he was treated in a discriminatory manner because of his gender.”); Vore v. Ind.
Bell Tel. Co., 32 F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (7th Cir. 1994) (unpleasant work environment caused by
one employee simply is not enough under Title VII without racial animus); see also Vito v.
Bausch & Lomb Inc., 403 F. App’x 593, 595–96 (2d Cir. 2010) (plaintiff’s complaints of a
hostile work environment were at best workplace bullying devoid of discriminatory motive and
not actionable). Additionally, some courts decline to aggregate general harassment with the
protected category harassment, thus the protected category harassment must be sufficiently severe
and pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. See Bowman, 220 F.3d at 463–64 (In a
hostile environment based on gender claim, the non-gender harassment must be “but for” the
employee’s gender to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis.).
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protected categories.52
That said, the construct of a “hostile work
environment,” though it must be a result of status-based discrimination, has
obvious parallels with workplace bullying.53
Some targets of workplace harassment have attempted to remedy instances
of workplace bullying with such common law tort theories as prima facie tort
or IIED.54 For example, one can recover under IIED if he or she can show the
aggressor’s conduct “has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”55 However, courts
have been reluctant to award damages for IIED claims in the workplace when
they are “unrelated to sexual harassment or other forms of status-based
discrimination.”56 Generally, IIED claims fail in cases involving workplace
bullying because the “cases lack two of the required elements for IIED
liability—either that the complained-of conduct was not severe or outrageous
or that the employee did not suffer severe emotional distress.”57 Although one

52. See, e.g., Beckford v. Dep’t of Corr., 605 F.3d 951, 960 (11th Cir. 2010); Holman v.
Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000).
53. Under federal law, a hostile work environment claim requires membership in a protected
group and a showing of unwelcome harassment due to the protected characteristic such as race or
gender. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986); Miller v. Kenworth
of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). The harassment must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive so as to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). This means that the
environment would be reasonably perceived as hostile (objective component) and was so
perceived by the plaintiff (subjective component). Id. at 21–22. Finally, the facts must suggest
direct or vicarious liability for the employer. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
764–65 (1998) (discussing employer liability and potential defenses); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998) (same).
54. Yamada, supra note 9, at 493.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts illustrates the tort of IIED as involving “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.” Id. § 46.
56. Yamada, supra note 9, at 494; see also Cheatham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 578, 586
(5th Cir. 2006) (applying Mississippi law and noting that employment disputes are rarely viable
IIED claims); Pollard v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, Inc., 412 F.3d 657, 664–65 (6th Cir. 2005)
(IIED direct liability sustained based upon “outrageous discriminatory conduct”); Nijem v. Alsco,
Inc., No. 3:10-00221, 2011 WL 2490748, at *16 (M.D. Tenn. June 6, 2011) (finding that
employment discrimination claims are rarely accompanied by sufficiently outrageous conduct to
support an IIED claim).
57. Yamada, supra note 9 at 494; see, e.g., Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365,
376 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that employer’s conduct was not outrageous, even if based on
discrimination); see also Yamada, supra note 1, at 257 (noting employment-related IIED
plaintiffs often fail to allege the requisite level of extreme and outrageous conduct and emotional
distress). Even assuming that a plaintiff has a viable IIED claim, such common law tort claims
often are barred by the exclusivity provisions of workers’ compensation statutes, which generally
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commentator has suggested that removing tort-law barriers to workplace
harassment claims is preferable to a statutory approach,58 modifying tort law
one court at a time would be an enormous undertaking given the relative
infrequency that courts overrule precedent.
For example, in Herrera v. Lufkin Industries, Inc., a federal district court
ruled that the defendant’s repeated references to the plaintiff as “the Mexican,”
among other racially motivated acts, were not sufficient to establish a claim of
IIED.59 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, despite its determination that there was a
“triable issue as to whether [the defendant] created a racially hostile work
environment actionable under Title VII.”60 The court concluded that “only the
most egregious conduct” is actionable under IIED.61 Thus, it seems that a
plaintiff alleging IIED in an employment situation may face a higher hurdle
than one who claims merely under protected-class status.62 Another difficulty
is that statutory employment discrimination claims may be the exclusive
remedy when the alleged discrimination is based upon protected status.63

provide that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for injuries arising in the course of
employment. E.g., Hibben v. Nardone, 137 F.3d 480, 483–84 (7th Cir. 1998).
Although one would hope it would be nonexistent, the academic context may involve a
faculty member bullying certain students. In Smith v. Atkins, the court affirmed a defamation
verdict against a law school professor based upon his harassment of a student. 622 So. 2d 795,
796 (La. Ct. App. 1993). The court not only affirmed the defamation verdict, but also concluded
that the student had suffered IIED and increased the damage award to $5,000 from $1,500. Id. at
800. On the other hand, a different court held that allegations that an instructor interfered with a
student’s educational plans by revoking pre-approved credits were insufficient to state an IIED
claim. Britt v. Chestnut Hill Coll., 632 A.2d 557, 558, 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Likewise, the
termination of a tenured professor without due process or a hearing was insufficient for an IIED
claim, but did merit a denial of qualified immunity insofar as the denial of due process. Newman
v. Kock, 274 S.W.3d 697, 701–02, 707–08 (Tex. App. 2008).
58. Sarah Morris, The Anti-Bullying Legislative Movement: Too Quick to Quash Common
Law Remedies, 65 BENCH & B. OF MINN., Nov. 2008, at 22, 25.
59. Herrera v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 474 F.3d 675, 687–88 (10th Cir. 2007).
60. Id. at 688; see also Clemente v. State, 206 P.3d 249, 255 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (“In every
case in which this court or the Supreme Court has allowed an IIED claim asserted in the context
of an employment relationship to proceed to a jury, the employer engaged in conduct that was not
only aggravating, insensitive, petty, irritating, perhaps unlawful, and mean—it also contained
some further and more serious aspect.” (footnote and citation omitted)).
61. Herrera, 474 F.3d at 688.
62. See Yamada, supra note 9, at 503.
63. See Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816, 818 (Tex. 2005) (explaining that
IIED is a gap-filler tort and that an IIED claim was not independent of the state human rights act);
Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 450 (Tex. 2004) (determining IIED
claim was not independent of state human rights act claim and could not support an award of
damages in excess of statutory cap in the act); see also Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313
S.W.3d 796, 802–04 (Tex. 2010) (holding that assault, negligent supervision, and retention claims
seeking to hold an employer liable are preempted by a tailored statutory scheme). Given that
bullying claims often will be paired with federal Title VII and state human rights act claims, IIED
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Because of the lack of legal remedies, employment lawyers may be reluctant to
represent or advise targets of harassment unless protected-class discrimination
is involved.64
III. STUDENT BULLYING AND THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
Courts in the United States have declined to recognize a cause of action for
targets of an abusive work environment beyond what has already been
established by statute and the common law. Thus, federal and state law
generally prohibit employment discrimination based upon protected status.65
While no jurisdiction has enacted a workplace bullying statute, most
jurisdictions (thirty-nine states) have enacted statutory provisions ranging from
requiring school districts to study and formulate a policy to address student-onstudent bullying, to prohibiting of all forms of bullying and retaliation for
reporting it.66 These acts usually define bullying and implicitly have dealt with

claims may be foreclosed. See Williamson v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. 2d 431, 457 (S.D.
Tex. 2010). From this, it seems a logical argument that any common law tort for workplace
bullying would be preempted by statutory remedies for employment discrimination.
64. See Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 281.
65. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
66. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.33.200, 14.33.210 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15341(A)(37) (Supp. 2010); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-18-514 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32109.1(2)(a)(X), (b)(VIII) (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §
4112D (2007); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 33-512(6) (2008); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/27-23.7 (2010) (prohibition of bullying); IND.
CODE § 20-33-8-13.5 (2007); IOWA CODE § 280.28 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (Supp.
2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.17 (Supp. 2011) (elementary school program that may
address bullying); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1001(15)(H) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC.
§§ 7-424, 7-424.1 (LexisNexis 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (Supp. 2010); MINN.
STAT. § 121A.0695 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (Supp. 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 792,137 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 388.122–.123, 388.132–.135, 388.139 (2009); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 193-F:2 to F:6 (Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-13 to -17 (West Supp.
2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-407.15 to .18 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3301.22,
3313.666–.667 (Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.2 to -100.5 (Supp. 2010); OR. REV.
STAT. § 339.351–.364 (2009); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West Supp. 2011); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 16-21-26 (Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 59-63-110 to -160 (Supp. 2010); TENN.
CODE. ANN. § 49-6-1014 to -1019 (2009); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001(a)(7) (West 2006 &
Supp. 2010), 37.083 (West 2006), 25.0342 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE. ANN. §§
53A-11a-102 to -402 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2006); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11(a)(32), 165(a)(1), 565 (Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.300.285,
28A.600.480 (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2C-1 to -5 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011);
WISC. STAT. § 118.46 (2009–10); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-311 to -315 (2011).
These statutes certainly reflect the sentiment that no student should be subject to
harassment at the hands of school faculty, staff, or peers. Why that sentiment has not manifested
itself in legislation to protect employees in the workplace is an obvious question. Some reasons
for the difference in protection may be that (1) elementary and secondary students are in a captive
environment given compulsory school attendance, (2) the state acts in a parens patriae capacity
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many issues that would arise in drafting a workplace harassment statute. They
are certainly important as potential resources in drafting anti-harassment
statutes in their respective states.67 That said, it is doubtful that these
provisions create a cause of action.68 On the federal front, the Office of Civil
Rights of the Department of Education has provided guidance in the form of a
“Dear Colleague” letter sent to universities and schools as to when student-onstudent bullying may violate federal civil rights law, the legal obligation to
protect students in protected categories, and examples of appropriate responses
in certain situations.69 Federal legislation has been introduced that would
require school entities to develop policies and programs to prevent and respond
to bullying and harassment.70 A real concern is that the latest of such measures
over those students, and (3) such student targets are less able to fend for themselves than adult
workers. The Supreme Court has long recognized that these factors may justify a greater level of
control than would be permissible over adults. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,
2626–27 (2007) (First Amendment); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)
(Fourth Amendment); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (First
Amendment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985) (Fourth Amendment); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (First Amendment). Indeed,
courts have long differentiated between permissible regulation of expression in the elementary
and secondary context and the smaller amount allowed in a university setting. E.g., McCauley v.
Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 242–47 (3d Cir. 2010). Although there are free expression
concerns, those advocating a legislative response to bullying in the public schools may have been
more successful characterizing it as a public health issue. Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note
14, at 287.
67. The Secretary of Education recently offered technical assistance to entities seeking to
craft laws or policies to reduce student-on-student bullying. Policy Letter from Arne Duncan,
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Governors & Chief State School Officers (Dec. 16, 2010),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/secletter/101215.html.
Attached was a
summary of key components of such a policy and examples of state-law provisions. Id.
enclosure.
68. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 339.364 (2009) (no cause of action created); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 16-21-26(l) (Supp. 2010) (same); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 59-63-150(A) (Supp. 2010) (same); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 53A-11a-402 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-315
(2011) (same).
69. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office
of Civil Rights, to colleague (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.html. The question of whether an institution’s response
should be grounded in a view of bullying as a generally unacceptable behavior or based upon the
specific actual or perceived characteristics of the victim has created some controversy. One
group, taking the former position, advocates for a model policy at the state or local level omitting
mention of protected categories and incorporating limits consistent with First Amendment
protection of verbal expression. Letter from Brian Raum, Austin R. Nimocks & Daniel
Blomberg, Counsel, Alliance Defense Fund, to Martin R. Castro, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n on
Civil Rights, ex. 1, Model Anti-Bullying Policy §§ II(A), III, V (May 12, 2011), available at
http://oldsite.alliancedefensefund.org/userdocs/USCCRbullyingpolicy.pdf.
70. Safe Schools Improvement Act of 2011, S. 506, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); Safe Schools
Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 1648, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); Tyler Clementi Higher Education
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does not contain an objective component and could restrict speech; the
Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX as proscribing student-on-student
harassment where the harassment is not only severe and pervasive, but also
objectively offensive so as to deprive a student of equal access to education.71
The approach to enacting these measures is largely based upon promoting
student health and safety (as well as promoting equal educational opportunity),
a lesson that is not lost on those favoring enactment of a statutory response to
workplace harassment, often called a “healthy workplace law.”72 Though
health and safety law in the United States largely protects against physical
hazards and injuries, it has been slow to recognize that workplace harassment
may involve both physical and psychological harm.73 Many other Western
nations have enacted statutes to protect workers from workplace bullying.74
Many countries in Europe, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, France,
Germany, Belgium, and Poland, have adopted some form of “anti-bullying”
legislation.75 Additionally, Canada has recognized the detrimental effects of
bullying in the workplace and has amended its Labour Code to require
employers to develop workplace-violence-prevention policies, which provide

Ant-Harassment Act of 2011, S. 540, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Tyler Clementi Higher Education
Anti-Harassment Act of 2011, H.R. 1048, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); see also Bullying Prevention
and Intervention Act of 2011, H.R. 83, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Anti-Bullying and Harassment
Act of 2011, H.R. 975, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
71. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). A plaintiff pursuing a
private action for damages also must show that the educational unit acted with deliberate
indifference, a very high standard of proof. Id. A plaintiff also may pursue a federal civil rights
claim based upon a violation of equal protection; Title IX is not an exclusive remedy. Fitzgerald
v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2009). For disabled students, another theory may
be relief under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act where the harassment is likely to
affect the student’s opportunity for an appropriate education. T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 779
F. Supp. 2d 289, 316–17 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). It seems clear that any statute concerning harassment
which limits the expressive content of speech must comport with the First Amendment. See
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d
200, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2001). Such restrictions in the public school setting might be justified on
any number of rationales, including that the speech (1) interferes with the rights of other students,
(2) would substantially disrupt school operations, (3) would bear the imprimatur of the school and
is contrary to legitimate pedagogical concerns, or (4) advocates unlawful activity (including
harassment). See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626–27; Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211–14.
72. See Yamada, supra note 1, at 278 (“We must put, front and center, the fact that
workplace bullying is a form of health-endangering psychological abuse.”).
73. David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV.
523, 564–65 (2009).
74. See Lueders, supra note 46, at 207–10 (describing various Western nations’ legislative
responses to workplace bullying).
75. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 150–153; Lueders, supra note 46, at 207–210.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

94

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:81

protection from workplace bullying.76 Though each country’s approach varies,
global recognition of the problem as one involving public health is emerging.
An important case from the United Kingdom resulted in a Deutsche Bank
employee receiving an award of £800,000 as a result of a “workplace bullying”
action.77 Under the United Kingdom’s Protection from Harassment Act, Helen
Green sued Deutsche Bank, her employer, for her coworkers’ harassing acts.78
Specifically, Ms. Green alleged that her coworkers frustrated her ability to
work by “moving her papers . . . hiding her mail, removing her from document
circulation lists, [and] ignoring and excluding her.”79 Ms. Green also produced
evidence that her workload increased unreasonably and that her coworkers
laughed at and made rude comments about her.80 As a result, Ms. Green fell
into depression and sought counseling.81 In 2006, a British court ruled in favor
of Ms. Green, holding Deutsche Bank vicariously liable for the actions of its
employees.82
IV. ACADEMIC HARASSMENT
Bullying or harassment encompasses a multitude of verbal and nonverbal
behaviors ranging from the impolite to the truly disrespectful.83 Academic
harassment can take many forms, from more overt aggressive behavior
directed towards a colleague including name-calling, rude expressions and
gestures, and intimidation, to the less overt, including circulating damaging
rumors and attempting to undermine a colleague’s career through official and
unofficial actions. Although one commonly thinks of harassment as
affirmative acts of aggression, another distinction is helpful: “aggressor bullies
and victim bullies.”84 By way of example, the aggressor bully might be a dean
who threatens to increase teaching loads unless the faculty subscribes to a new
vision of applied research, at the expense of ongoing research. It could be a
mid-level administrator who withholds teaching assignments and locations for
the adjunct faculty until immediately prior to the start of the term as a means of

76. Canada Occupational Health and Safety Regulations (Violence Prevention in the Work
Place), SOR/86-304, § 20.3.
77. Susan Harthill, Bullying in the Workplace: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 17 MINN.
J. INTL. L. 247, 284 (2008); Green v. DB Group Servs. (UK) Ltd., [2006] EWHC 1898 (Q.B).
78. Harthill, supra note 77, at 284–85.
79. Id. at 284.
80. Id. at 284–85.
81. Id. at 247–48.
82. Id. at 284.
83. See SUTTON, supra note 20, at 10 (listing “The Dirty Dozen” actions used by harassers);
Christopher S. Simon & Denise B. Simon, Bully for You; Full Steam Ahead: How Pennsylvania
Employment Law Permits Bullying in the Workplace, 16 WIDENER L.J. 141, 143–45 (2006)
(listing 44 behaviors).
84. C.K. GUNSALUS, THE COLLEGE ADMINISTRATOR’S SURVIVAL GUIDE 123 (2006).
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control. It could be a colleague who glares at another when no one else is
around, but is cordial if others are near. It could be a colleague who practices
bullying within a discipline, targeting those with research points of view out of
favor with the general community and undermining their work. In contrast, the
victim bully might be a faculty member who constantly pressures for various
perquisites because he is a “star” and he perceives that the powers that be have
bestowed some inequity upon him. This bully is high maintenance and may
enjoy conflict. That said, and remembering the importance of the victim or
target’s perspective, it is doubtful that the latter conduct would constitute
actionable harassment without more.
Though it is impossible to catalogue all of the behaviors that might
comprise academic harassment, a bully in the academic context crosses the line
into uncivilized behavior where others would be inhibited.85 Of course,
everyone has the potential to depart from civility, particularly when under
pressure. Thus, it is important to emphasize that academic harassment is
characterized not by isolated incidents, but rather by consistently negative
interactions.
Several factors unique to the academic environment may allow such
harassment to go unchecked. First, the academic environment is difficult for a
newcomer to break into (a department may have members that have interacted
for years) and it is rare that expectations concerning standards of civility are
communicated consistently. Second, academic institutions are decentralized
organizations and monitoring of professional day-to-day behavior is rare.86
Third, given the inner-directed nature of most academic activities, it is often
far easier to ignore such a problem than to deal with it. For most employees, a
natural human tendency is to avoid conflict rather than confront it. Fourth, an
academic may belong to several work groups—including a department,
college, governance committees, as well as discipline-related professional
entities—and simply may not have the time or inclination to deal with a
problem. Fifth, academic success is largely an individual effort—successful
research and teaching, while at times collaborative, depend upon sustained,
individual effort, and a faculty member may still be able to perform
notwithstanding the harassment. Sixth, the larger concepts of academic
freedom and collegiality often cause colleagues to accept a wide range of
professional demeanor.87 Seventh, many in academic administrative roles are
there only for a short time and have little managerial experience.88 Finally, an

85. Id. at 122.
86. See id. at 124.
87. Id.
88. Kenneth W. Borland, The Relationship Between Faculty and Academic Administration
in Governance Functions, in 4 EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 85, 89 (Michael T.
Miller & Julie Caplow eds., 2003) (discussing the brief tenures of academic administrators);
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academic enterprise has a very hierarchical structure (full professor, associate
professor, assistant professor, lecturer, and adjunct professor), and those of
lesser rank are often dependent upon those of higher rank and unwilling to
confront bad behavior for fear of retaliation.89 For example, a full or associate
professor may be instrumental in tenure decisions concerning assistant
professors, or a department chair may decide the terms and conditions under
which lecturers and adjunct professors work, including course assignments,
course load, and compensation.
At the same time, several factors suggest that such harassment is a “lowincidence, high-severity” problem in the academic context.90 First, most
faculty members have experienced other institutions of higher learning and are
aware of acceptable conduct. Particularly in hiring, most departments seek to
avoid difficult colleagues with whom they may have to work for many years.91
Second, taking the longer view, faculty members cooperate knowing that they
must work with others given the various committees and task forces that
accomplish the academic mission and governance of the institution. Taking
the shorter view, the academic workforce is highly qualified and mobile; most
academic personnel have options (though that may be changing in an era of
reduced public funding for higher education) should a situation become
intolerable due to harassment. Third, even given some harassment, the time
spent interacting with any one academic may be limited, particularly for those
not in senior or administrative roles. Moreover, the academic environment is
often fluid (deans and department chairs do change) so harassment may be a
short-term phenomenon. Fourth, an academic career offers a great deal of
autonomy with reference to an external discipline. This may deter the harasser
or at least provide a network of support for the target.
Without question, harassment can have a destructive effect on the
academic environment. Often the harasser will be largely unsupervised and
free to inflict harm.92 A new faculty member certainly will have many
challenges and demands on his or her time; dealing with a bully should not be
one of them.93 The energy needed to deal with a harasser may affect

Michael A. Fitts, The Non-Management Side of Academic Administration, 41 U. TOL. L. REV.
283, 283 (2010) (noting academic administrators’ frequent lack of traditional management
experience).
89. In this regard, a test for bad behavior particularly in the academic context might be
whether the person “aim[s] his or her venom at people who are less powerful rather than at those
people who are more powerful?” SUTTON, supra note 20, at 9.
90. GUNSALUS, supra note 84, at 124.
91. SUTTON, supra note 20, at 2.
92. GUNSALUS, supra note 84, at 122–23.
93. For example, in Recio v. Evers, a tenured professor was placed on probation and required
to attend counseling based upon a complaint by a newly-hired professor that the tenured professor
sent her a string of demanding e-mails that appeared to have a sexual content. 771 N.W.2d 121,
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productivity, the safety of the workplace and the employee’s physical and
mental well-being, as well as institutional integrity.94 Preventive and
educational efforts may yield better results than waiting for such conduct to
occur.95
V. PROPOSED RESPONSES
Much debate exists about the most effective way to combat bullying in the
American workplace. Those who seek an end to “workplace bullying” propose
a statutory solution, similar to laws enacted in other countries, which would
promote “prevention, self-help, compensation, and punishment.”96 One
proposal is a cause of action called “intentional infliction of a hostile work
environment,” which would require a plaintiff to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant employer, its
agent, or both, intentionally subjected the plaintiff to a hostile work
environment. A hostile work environment is one that is deemed hostile by
both the plaintiff and by a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation.
Employers are to be held vicariously liable for hostile work environments
97
intentionally created by their agents.

Such an approach would incorporate both a subjective and objective evaluation
of the allegedly hostile conduct consistent with federal law. The subjective
element would require a plaintiff to believe that a defendant’s conduct was the
cause of, or contributed to, the creation of a hostile work environment, while
the reasonable person standard would discourage frivolous claims.98
Furthermore, the reasonable person standard would permit recovery for a broad

129–30 (Neb. 2009). The tenured professor was described by those in the department as
“obsessive, a bully, aggressive, irrational, . . . demanding, creates conflict, stalking, retaliates,
rages, verbal violence, explosive, forceful and creates a hostile work environment.” Id. at 130.
An acrimonious department meeting, years after the e-mails, precipitated the complaint; the court
noted that the record made it clear that department members “did not get along with one another.”
Id. at 129. The tenured professor sued the junior professor for interference with a business
relationship, but the court held that the sexual harassment complaint was truthful and therefore
could not be the basis such a claim. Id. at 137.
94. See GARY NAMIE & RUTH NAMIE, THE BULLY AT WORK 11 (2000). In Yancick v.
Hanna Steel Corp., the Seventh Circuit considered a claim in a federal race-discrimination case
that a co-employee intentionally caused an industrial accident severely injuring the target. No.
10-1368, 2011 WL 3319568, at *14 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 2011). The court determined that the coemployee “was an equal opportunity bully” (rather than one motivated by race) and concluded
that the evidence was insufficient to show that the accident was racially motivated. Id. at *14–15.
Still, the case stands out as another reminder of the limits of federal anti-discrimination law and
the danger a bully may pose in the workplace.
95. GUNSALUS, supra note 84, at 125.
96. Yamada, supra note 9, at 524.
97. Id.
98. See id.
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range of abuses rather than limiting the cause of action only to statutorily
defined behaviors.99 Relief under such an approach would reflect the
compensation and punishment goals of the statute.100 Damages likely would
be modeled on those available under employment discrimination statutes,
which “allow for back pay, front pay, reinstatement, punitive damages, and
injunctive relief.”101 Where an employee does not suffer any tangible adverse
employment actions (such as discharge or demotion), an employer may defend
on the basis that it took steps to prevent or promptly correct the harassment and
the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage.102 Significantly, the
defense would be only available to the employer; co-workers and supervisors
who perpetrated the harassment still could be sued.103
Another proposal—the Model Healthy Workplace Bill104—makes it
unlawful to subject an employee to an abusive work environment and provides
for vicarious liability for an employer,105 though it is apparent that both
employers and employees can be defendants.106 An abusive work environment
occurs when a defendant, acting with malice, subjects an employee to abusive
conduct so severe that it causes psychological or physical harm that is
documented or supported by expert evidence.107 Requiring malice and tangible
harm are the primary means of deterring marginal claims.108 Still, the
definitions are broad: conduct includes acts and omissions, and while abusive
conduct must be unrelated to an employer’s legitimate interests, it includes
“repeated infliction of verbal abuse such as the use of derogatory remarks,
insults, and epithets; verbal or physical conduct that a reasonable person would
find threatening, intimidating, or humiliating; or the gratuitous sabotage or
undermining of a person’s work performance.”109 Whether abusive conduct
has been shown depends upon the “severity, nature, and frequency of the
defendant’s conduct,” though a single act may be deemed such conduct if

99. See Lueders, supra note 46, at 230.
100. Yamada, supra note 9, at 528–29.
101. Id. at 528.
102. Id. at 527–28.
103. Id. at 528.
104. David C. Yamada, Crafting a Legislative Response to Workplace Bullying, 8 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL’Y J. 475 app. (2004).
105. Id. app. §§ 3–4.
106. Id. app. § 7(2) (limiting employer liability in certain circumstances and explaining
section does not apply to “individually named co-employee defendants”).
107. Id. app. §§ 2(3), (3)(c)–(d); see also id. at 500 (discussing the subjective prong of the
Healthy Workplace Bill).
108. Yamada, supra note 1, at 262, 269. The Bill does not require a plaintiff to prove a
subjective perception of abuse, instead relying upon the requirement of tangible harm which most
likely encompasses such a perception. Id. at 263.
109. Yamada, supra note 104, app. §§ 2(3), (3)(a), (3)(c).
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“especially severe and egregious.”110 The Bill contains traditional affirmative
defenses under employment discrimination law involving actions other than
adverse employment actions: an employer will not be liable where the
employer took reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the actionable
behavior and where the targeted employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of such opportunities.111 Another affirmative defense is where the
employer takes an adverse action against an employee based on legitimate
business interests, such as performance issues, or reasonably investigates
potentially unlawful or unethical activity.112 The Bill is enforced by a private
right of action (without any administrative prerequisite to proceeding in state
court) and provides a one-year limitation period from the last act of the
harassment.113 Relief reflects the goals of compensation and deterrence, and
includes injunction, removal of the perpetrator from the work environment,
reinstatement, back pay, front pay, medical expenses, emotional distress
damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.114
In the United States, legislation to combat workplace harassment has been
introduced in twenty-one states, but none has been adopted as law.115
Advocates of such legislation base their proposals on the Model Healthy
Workplace Bill,116 discussed above, which creates a private right of action for
victims of workplace harassment. The cause of action would expand
employment harassment protections to non-protected status classes, thereby
filling a gap in federal and state civil rights protections.117 The Bill contains a
definition of an “abusive workplace” and the requirement that a claimant

110. Id. app. § 2(3)(c).
111. Id. app. § 5(A); see also Yamada, supra note 1, at 264 (discussing one of the affirmative
defenses available under the Bill).
112. Yamada, supra note 104, app. § 5(B).
113. Id. app. § 8.
114. Id. app. § 7.
115. Healthy Workplace Bill: Legislative History in the United States, NEW YORK HEALTHY
WORKPLACE ADVOCATES, http://www.nyhwa.org/7.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). The states
include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. The New York senate passed a
Healthy Workplace Bill, but the bill did not make it out of the state assembly. See Adam Cohen,
New Laws Target Workplace Bullying, TIME (July 21, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/
article/0,8599,2005358,00.html?xid=rss-fullnation-yahoo.
116. Lueders, supra note 46, at 227; see also Quick Facts About the Healthy Workplace Bill,
HEALTHY WORKPLACE BILL, http://www.healthyworkplacebill.org/bill.php#facts (last visited
Nov. 7, 2011) (providing a description and overview of the Model Healthy Workplace Bill). For
an example of a bill introduced, see A. 673, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/A1000/673_I1.pdf.
117. Quick Facts About the Health Workplace Bill, supra note 116.
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provide medically acknowledged proof of harm to health.118 This may include
physical or psychological damages.119 In theory, the act attempts to protect
both employees and employers who have adopted policies to combat abusive
workplaces.120
In contrast, critics of a workplace-harassment act claim it will increase
frivolous litigation and employer liability.121 The availability of such claims is
tantamount to more regulation of employers. Critics also fear that such vague
legislation would provide little guidance to potential defendants, who can
include employers as well as employees.122 They argue that the workplace is a
self-correcting entity,123 in that at-will employment allows victimized
employees to terminate their contracts as soon as “the net value of the
employment contract turns negative.”124 As a result, the market self-corrects
because bad employers who suffer losses are forced to correct these problems
internally, and good employees are drawn to employers with good reputations,
who then prosper.125 Critics also point to the public awareness of the harms of
workplace harassment and suggest that internal prevention efforts, including an
anti-harassment policy with clear outcomes, may yield better results.126
It seems clear that state adoption of a Model Healthy Workplace Bill
would work a significant change in the employment area in terms of access to
the courts and liability for individual defendants.127 First, under federal antidiscrimination law, an employee must file an administrative charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 or 300
days (depending upon the state) after the unlawful employment practice
occurs.128 The purpose of the administrative exhaustion requirement is to

118. Id.
119. Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 286.
120. See Quick Facts About the Healthy Workplace Bill, supra note 116 (enumerating the
Healthy Workplace Bill’s attempts to protect both parties).
121. Yamada, supra note 9, at 532–33.
122. Lueders, supra note 46, at 236; Victoria Pynchon, New York Anti-Bullying Law A Big
Bad Idea, ON THE DOCKET: INSIDE THE COURTROOM (May 28, 2010, 10:15 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/docket/2010/05/28/new-york-anti-bullying-law-a-big-bad-idea/.
123. See Yamada, supra note 9, at 532.
124. Id. (quoting Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947, 966 (1984)).
125. See id. Thus, an employer could conceivably adopt an anti-harassment policy that could
modify an at-will employment arrangement. See, e.g., Baker v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., No.
06-cv-01103-PSF-BNB, 2007 WL 4287494, at *12–13 (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2007).
126. See supra note 6 (describing the Society for Human Resource Management’s criticism of
pending anti-bullying legislation).
127. Brian K. LaFratta, Crackdown on Bullies: Bills in Several States Would Give Employees
Tools to Fight Abusive Conduct in the Workplace, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 29, 2008, at S1.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
118 (2002).
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allow the EEOC to investigate and attempt conciliation.129 If the matter is not
resolved administratively, the employee receives a notice of a right to sue in
federal court.130 Contrast that with a state cause of action that would require
no administrative exhaustion and may be pursued directly in state court pro
se.131 This could be a definite advantage to employees, as federal courts are
perceived as being more formal and more complex for litigation.132
State courts also may be less likely to grant summary judgment or
judgment on the pleadings in favor of employer defendants than federal
courts.133 And of course, federal anti-discrimination claims have caps on
damages based on employer size.134 The model act caps employer liability at
$25,000 per unlawful employment practice (with no punitive damages) for
emotional distress damages in the absence of an adverse employment decision;
given an adverse employment decision, the damages could be unlimited.135
The model act also may bring in more defendants (employer and harasser
employees) whereas under federal law, it is the employer that is sued.136

129. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see, e.g., Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44, 47; McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
131. Of course, states have anti-discrimination statutes also, but probably require
administrative exhaustion.
132. Oddly enough, the lack of an administrative mechanism in the Bill is designed to
discourage weak claims by denying agency representation to pro se litigants and by making the
plaintiff’s bar a gatekeeper—those with weak cases will find it difficult to obtain an attorney.
Yamada, supra note 104, at 505; see also Yamada, supra note 1, at 266 (discussing the Bill’s
enforceability by private right of action). This rationale seems counter-intuitive given that
plaintiffs are certainly able to file pro se.
133. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
517, 522, 522–23 nn.25–26 (2010) (describing the perception that state courts are more favorable
to plaintiffs and federal courts are more favorable to defendants in such situations). Since 1986,
federal courts have been encouraged to use summary judgment to eliminate factually unsupported
claims. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–51 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325–26 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Likewise, recent case law encourages federal courts to grant motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim where the complaint states merely a conceivable claim, not a
plausible one. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–51 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court will take a
complaint’s factual allegations as true in deciding whether it meets the “plausibility test,” but not
its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006). The caps on compensatory and punitive damages range
from $50,000 to $300,000 depending upon the employer’s number of employees. Id.
135. Yamada, supra note 104, app. § 7(2).
136. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (noting that
the retaliatory provision of Title VII does not allow for individual liability); Fantini v. Salem
State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 28–31 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding there is no individual employee liability
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How would such a measure affect the academic environment? As a
starting point, many institutions have adopted the American Association of
University Professors’ (AAUP) statement of professional ethics, which
proscribes harassment or discriminatory treatment of colleagues and
students.137 As with most work environments, differentiating workplace
harassment from legitimate performance-related judgments and managerial
prerogative is essential. An academic environment is all about knowledge
creation and this involves content-based choices and criticism that might be
mistaken for harassment. Conflict based upon competing ideas is often part of
the creative process; conflict based upon relentless personal attacks is not.138
Additionally, academia comprises many diverse personalities, and styles of
interaction certainly differ. Tolerance is essential; colleagues do not have to
like one another. But, if the internal dissension proves too much and the
research and teaching mission is compromised, a university may intervene
notwithstanding the personal positions of the faculty.139 Of course, the
university must do so consistent with First Amendment concerns and the due
process rights of the tenured faculty.140
under Title VII); Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding that
a Title VII claim may not be brought against an individual employee).
137. Statement on Professional Ethics, in AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, AAUP POLICY
DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 171, 171–72 (10th ed. 2006).
138. Yamada, supra note 1, at 270 (rejecting the idea “that malicious, psychological abuse of
an employee is all part of healthy competition, a form of social Darwinism that separates the
wheat from the chaff and frees people to excel”).
139. See Webb v. Bd. of Trs. of Ball State Univ., 167 F.3d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that universities may intervene when tensions become overwhelming).
140. Thus, in Hulen v. Yates, four members of an accounting and taxation department at a
state university were transferred to different departments after being warned that efforts to revoke
a colleague’s tenure might be met with adverse action. 322 F.3d 1229, 1233 & n.1 (10th Cir.
2003) (per curiam). The plaintiff had tenure and taught tax, but was transferred to the
management department and only allowed to teach two tax classes per year. Id. at 1233. The
Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff had a property interest in his departmental assignment
entitling him to due process, which he received, but remanded the case for a trial on his First
Amendment retaliation claims. Id. at 1243–44, 1249. Although the court determined that the
plaintiff spoke out on a matter of public concern and his interests in speaking out were not
outweighed by the university’s interest in departmental harmony, id. at 1238–39, the case
predates Garcetti v. Ceballos which held that public employee speech pursuant to official duties
is not protected under the First Amendment, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
In a somewhat similar case, an accounting department faculty member was relieved from
teaching responsibilities after complaints of negative and disruptive behavior by colleagues.
DePree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282, 285–86 (5th Cir. 2009). The faculty member claimed
retaliation based upon his complaints to the accreditation body (AACSB) and denial of a liberty
and property interest in his employment. Id. at 286. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the
university president was entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment retaliation claim
because the law was not clearly established that being relieved of teaching duties (while
maintaining tenure, salary, and rank) constituted adverse action. Id. at 287–88. The court also
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A larger concern is not to compromise academic freedom with minor or
groundless complaints. Faculty members are entitled to freedom in teaching,
research and publication, and speaking out as citizens without fear of adverse
employment action.141 This professional conception of academic freedom also
may enjoy some constitutional protection.142 Accordingly, some leeway
concerning faculty conduct is necessary to protect academic freedom and give
it sufficient breathing room.143 Professional disagreements can get quite
heated, but at what point does pressing an issue constitute harassment?
Likewise, faculty appointments on the tenure track require critical judgment
that could easily be deemed unjustified or abusive by an unsuccessful
candidate.144 Of course, academic freedom has always carried with it a
professional responsibility for ethical behavior in performing research,
Likewise, it should carry a
publication, and teaching functions.145
responsibility not to engage in repeated, destructive, and discriminatory
conduct aimed at a colleague or other university constituents.146
Some limits probably are essential. Federal law is replete with the maxim
that the purpose of anti-discrimination law is not to create a general civility
code.147 And with good reason—such a code would be difficult to enforce and
could very well chill expression.148 Additionally, Title VII was never intended

concluded that the action could not support a due process claim as the faculty member did not
have a property interest in specific duties without a contractual or statutory provision to the
contrary. Id. at 289–90.
141. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AM. ASS’N OF UNIV.
PROFESSORS, AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3, 3 (10th ed. 2006).
142. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
143. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991).
144. Loraleigh Keashly & Joel H. Neuman, Faculty Experiences with Bullying in Higher
Education: Causes, Consequences, and Management, 32 ADMIN. THEORY & PRAXIS 48, 56
(2010); see, e.g., Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2006)
(regarding the non-reappointment of assistant professor in fifth year). Academic freedom
concerning appointment of faculty is probably the area where courts defer most—so it may well
be that courts would continue to do so even given a new tort of workplace harassment.
145. William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue
of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59, 71 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed.,
1975); see Pugel v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 378 F.3d 659, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the
university’s interest in the integrity of its intellectual mission and research outweighed teaching
assistant’s interest in presenting fabricated data).
146. See Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 881–83, 887 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that assistant
professor’s demeaning comments were not entitled to First Amendment protection); Robert J.
Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the Application of Garcetti v.
Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 154 (2009) (noting that abusive
behavior in an academic setting is not entitled to First Amendment protection).
147. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
148. See Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 285–86.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

104

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:81

to turn courts into a “super-personnel department.”149 Hence, under federal
law, the harassment must be severe or pervasive enough so as to alter the terms
and conditions of the victim’s employment.150 There also is a subjective and
an objective component—not only must the harassment be perceived as such
by the complaining individual, but a reasonable person would also have the
This inquiry is based upon the totality of the
same perception.151
circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the harassment, whether
it is threatening or humiliating, and whether it interferes with job
performance.152
The Tenth Circuit recently considered two faculty members’ claims of
retaliation for reporting discrimination. In Somoza v. University of Denver, the
court determined that the faculty members could not prove that a reasonable
person would have been dissuaded from reporting discrimination, an objective
requirement under federal law.153 The court suggested that the faculty
members “may have had to withstand colleagues that do not like them, are
rude, and may be generally disagreeable people,” but the court could not
“mandate that certain individuals work on their interpersonal skills and cease
engaging in inter-departmental personality conflicts.”154 While not trivializing
the subjective discomfort, the court held that “various instances of incivility,
rudeness, and allegedly offensive statements regarding their ethnicity and
national origin” simply were not enough under the objective test.155 The case
is instructive because it involves typical department strife—faculty hiring,
interaction among members, and resource allocation.
Another recurring issue is vicarious liability: in what circumstances should
the academic institution be liable for the conduct of the harasser when the
employee has suffered no tangible employment action (e.g., demotion or loss
of pay)? Current law allows the institution an affirmative defense to liability
and damages, given a hostile work environment created by a supervisor, when
the institution can prove it took prompt corrective action when informed of the
problem and the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of measures
designed to prevent the harassment.156 Such policies encourage institutions to
adopt and educate employees about internal protocol for handling and
resolving such claims.

149. Downing v. Tapella, 729 F. Supp. 2d 88, 93–94 (D.D.C. 2010).
150. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
151. Id. at 21–22.
152. Id. at 23.
153. Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1219.
156. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998).
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The academic setting also presents unique issues due to the variety of
employment relationships relative to the institution. Tenured faculty members
serve in a “for cause” employment relationship, while non-tenure track faculty
and staff generally serve in an “at will” capacity. This difference may manifest
itself in the opportunity for workplace bullying, an institution’s response, and
the response of the victim. Policies may not apply uniformly to all groups.
For instance, at the authors’ university the “Dispute Resolution” policy
providing for a variety of specified resolution processes is applicable to
“employees”—defined as “staff, coworkers, and supervisors.”157
“Supervisors” include “faculty who supervise staff.”158 Faculty are not
afforded a formal process, although the university has a voluntary faculty
dispute resolution program which utilizes faculty mediators and is nonbinding.159
The faculty handbook makes it clear that evaluations are based upon
teaching, scholarly work, service, and personal characteristics.160 Personal
characteristics include “emotional stability or maturity” and “demonstrated
collegiality and interactional skills so that an individual can work
harmoniously with others.”161 Faculty members also are evaluated based upon
ethical behavior, which plainly has an effect on the institution;162 just as the
university subscribes to the principles of academic freedom, so too to the
ethical proscription against harassment of students and colleagues as well as
discrimination.163 The faculty handbook also provides for a Faculty Ethics and
Advisory Committee, which advises and consults the President of the
University and others regarding action to be taken where a faculty member is
accused of ethical violations.164 It contains some very general areas of
unacceptable interaction; however, it does not detail specific remedies.165 This
disparity may reflect a self-policing aspect of faculty membership.

157. University Business Policies and Procedures Manual: 3220 Dispute Resolution Policy,
UNIV. OF N.M., http://www.unm.edu/~ubppm/ubppmanual/3220.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
158. Id.
159. See UNIV. OF N.M., OMBUDS/DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES FOR FACULTY, available
at http://ombudsfac.unm.edu/ODR_Brochure_final_080210.pdf.
160. UNIV. OF N.M., FACULTY HANDBOOK § B1.2(a), available at http://www.unm.edu/
~handbook/Faculty%20Handbook.pdf.
161. Id. § B1.2.4.
162. Id.
163. Id. § B1.1(a)-(b); id. app. V, § II (“[Professors] avoid any exploitation, harassment, or
discriminatory treatment of students.”); id. app. V, § III (“Professors do not discriminate against
or harass colleagues.”).
164. Id. § A61.8.
165. See UNIV. OF N.M., supra note 160, § C05 (describing acts of misconduct and sanctions
for committing such acts). Under consideration at the authors’ university is a faculty disciplinary
policy which would provide a mechanism to discipline faculty for violations of university policy.
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Given the documented personnel and organizational costs of workplace
harassment,166 a strong argument can be made that a university ought to adopt
an anti-harassment policy before it is necessitated by law.167 Moreover, a
university can craft a policy that places a high value on free expression.
Probably the most difficult task is defining harassment; such a definition
should be specific so as to limit the discretion of those applying it. Any policy
must address whether an additional right is being created (unlikely) and
whether it is intended to limit any other administrative remedies concerning
bullying (also unlikely). It should contain both a subjective and objective test
for harassment. It should differentiate between professional academic freedom
and prohibited harassment and make clear that it is to be interpreted consistent
with First Amendment values.168 It should include an anti-retaliation provision
protecting those who report or assist in the detection and prevention of
bullying. In addition to legislative proposals discussed above, there are
examples of such policies adopted in the educational context.169 Such a policy
probably can be added to existing anti-discrimination policies and utilize
similar procedures, including prompt investigations and attempted
conciliation.170 Faculty can be made aware of such a policy through training
and as a component of performance evaluations.171
Not losing sight of the First Amendment is especially important in an
academic environment. Recently, the Ninth Circuit considered a claim that a
community college was responsible for a hostile work environment by failing
to enforce its anti-harassment policy against a math professor who aired some
of his views on race via e-mail and a website maintained by the college.172
The court had no trouble concluding that the Equal Protection Clause contains
a right to be free of harassment based upon protected status and that a public

166. The costs of retaining a bully may include employee turnover and absenteeism, lost
productivity, higher health care costs, and increased workers’ compensation and discrimination
claims. To the extent that these matters take time and personnel (lawyers) to resolve, or result in
damage awards (albeit under a different theory than workplace bullying), the organization is
employing resources on a non-productive endeavor. See Michael Sheehan, Workplace Bullying:
Responding with Some Emotional Intelligence, 20 INT’L J. OF MANPOWER 57, 59–62 (1999).
167. Carol Rick Gibbons et al., Don’t Get Pushed Around: What Employers Should Do to
Address Bullying Behavior in the Workplace, ACC DOCKET, Apr. 2010, at 84, 90.
168. For an example of such direction in the context of a school anti-bullying law, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.18(a) (2009), which provides that it “shall not be construed to permit
school officials to punish student expression or speech based on an undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance or out of a desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”
169. See SIOUX CITY CMTY. SCH. BD., CODE NO. 403.5, WORKPLACE BULLYING (2009),
available at http://www.siouxcityschools.org/pages/uploaded_files/403%205.pdf.
170. See Gibbons, supra note 167, at 90.
171. Id. at 90–91.
172. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 705–06 (9th Cir. 2010).
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employer is required to take prompt action to stop the harassment (although
discipline of the harasser is not required).173 But the court concluded that the
professor’s speech was not unlawful harassment; rather, it was protected
speech on an issue of public concern.174 Content regulation (suppression based
solely on an unpopular viewpoint) is generally prohibited by the First
Amendment, and the court deferred, upon academic freedom grounds, on the
speech and the college’s decision not to take any action against the
professor.175 The court’s decision was heavily influenced by First Amendment
values, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, as to
protected speech and academic freedom.176
Harassment law generally involves regulating conduct, but when it
regulates speech the First Amendment is implicated and some line-drawing is
inevitable. It is clear that anti-harassment policies are subject to the First
Amendment.177 Given the interest in equal opportunity, one such formulation
is to allow the regulation when the harassing speech is directed only at the
plaintiff, not the public at large.178 Another approach is that such regulation is
permissible in the employment context because harassment is simply beyond
First Amendment protection.179 In any event, any workplace harassment

173. Id. at 707.
174. Id. at 708. A somewhat similar case, though not concerning academic freedom in the
workplace, concerns a high school student’s right to wear a T-shirt with the message “Be Happy,
Not Gay.” Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 2011). A
school official banned display of the slogan as contrary to a school rule prohibiting spoken or
written derogatory comments based upon sexual orientation. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that
such a ban violated two students’ First Amendment rights given the lack of evidence of
substantial disruption caused by the message and affirmed nominal damage awards in favor of the
students. Id. at 880–82. Of course, an academic employer has substantial leeway in regulating
the off-topic speech of faculty directed at students, see Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d
667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006), but the words of the panel resonate: “[P]eople in our society do not have
a legal right to prevent criticism of their beliefs or even their way of life.” Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at
876–77 (rejecting a “hurt feelings” defense to the violation of constitutional rights).
175. Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 709; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)
(establishing that the government may not prohibit speech merely because society disagrees or is
offended).
176. Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 709.
177. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316 (3d Cir. 2008).
178. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1791, 1845–46 (1992) (proposing that an interest in assuring equality in the workplace
justifies restricting speech directed at a particular employee).
179. See, e.g., Miranda Oshige McGowan, Certain Illusions About Speech: Why the FreeSpeech Critique of Hostile Work Environment Harassment Is Wrong, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 391,
397–98 (2002) (arguing that harassment law is designed to prevent economic disruption and that
the harassing expression does not implicate First Amendment protection).
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policy in the university setting ought to have a sense of place—recognizing
that a university traditionally has been open to new ideas.180
Assuming that a university adopted an anti-harassment policy, how might
it be challenged on First Amendment grounds? If it was a faculty member
(suppose the faculty member received a reprimand for allegedly harassing a
colleague about a grant), the faculty member might grieve it in accordance
with university policies pertaining to academic freedom and free expression.
To the extent that the faculty member contested it on First Amendment
grounds, one roadblock would be that only employee speech on a matter of
public concern is protected; workplace speech pertaining to private matters
generally is not.181 Another roadblock is Garcetti v. Ceballos, which held that
public employee speech that is pursuant to job responsibilities simply is not
protected by the First Amendment.182 Garcetti left open whether speech
related to teaching and research might be protected under an academic freedom
rationale, but the contours of any such exception are not clear.183 Garcetti
continues a trend recognizing managerial prerogative and that when the
government regulates as an employer it has far greater latitude. It represents a
formidable barrier (along with the doctrine of qualified immunity)184 to
challenging managerial action based upon denial of free speech.

180. See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211, 231–32 (Cal. 2006) (Chin, J.,
concurring) (noting that the First Amendment may protect speech central to creative process
where workplace product is itself expression).
181. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). The Supreme Court has extended the
public concern requirement to the right to petition, which includes the filing of grievances.
Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011).
182. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773–
74 (7th Cir. 2008).
183. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. The Ninth Circuit recently granted qualified immunity to
various university faculty members based on a former professor’s claims that he was denied a
merit salary increase in retaliation for his criticism of the hiring and promotion of other
professors, as well as the hiring of lecturers. Hong v. Grant, 403 F. App’x 236, 237–38 (9th Cir.
2010). The district court held that the professor’s statements were pursuant to his official duties
as a faculty member and therefore not protected. Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1168
(C.D. Cal. 2007). In the alternative, the district court determined that the speech was not on a
matter of public concern and likewise unprotected. Id. at 1169–70. The Ninth Circuit did not
decide whether the speech was protected and instead granted qualified immunity on the basis that
the law was not clearly established in 2004, let alone today, that faculty members had a right to
comment on discretionary administrative matters free from retaliation. Hong, 403 F. App’x at
237–38 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (declining to decide whether there is an “academic
exception” for speech related to teaching or research)).
184. An individual defendant may raise a qualified immunity defense so as to defeat civil
liability for damages. Once raised, a plaintiff must establish that the facts as alleged establish a
constitutional violation and that the constitutional right in question was clearly established, viz.,
that a reasonably-informed public official would have been aware that his or her specific conduct
violated that right. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815–16 (2009). Qualified immunity
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CONCLUSION
Current statutory and common law tort actions provide certain restricted
avenues of legal redress for those who have been subjected to harassment by
their coworkers and/or employers. It seems clear that federal discrimination
statutes are inadequate to perform that task because of their requirement that
the harassment be a product of class-based discriminatory animus. Some form
of administrative mechanism for developing interpretive guidance and
attempted administrative resolution of workplace harassment complaints ought
to precede court involvement; currently, that function is performed by the
EEOC for many discrimination complaints.185 A federal response has the
advantage of uniformity, particularly for employers, although the costs of
implementing such a system are not insubstantial. At the same time, the
United States embraces an at-will employment model and places a high value
on freedom of expression; there may be merit to the idea that workplace
harassment—barring the presence of a discriminatory or tortious act—should
be addressed at the institutional level (via prevention) or through alternative
dispute resolution, which could be incorporated into a general employment
policy.186 After all, universities as large employers always have the potential
to become defendants in employment-related lawsuits—a preventive law
orientation would consider the legal exposure and address it through adoption
of an anti-harassment policy, a procedural mechanism to enforce it, and
education and training of the workforce, much as has been done for protectedstatus discrimination and harassment.187 Even if institutional exposure is low
because of the lack of federal and state law providing a cause of action, a
university might still want to consider such a policy as an option to promote
dignity and respect in the workplace, and perhaps avoid regulation in the
future.188 The progress made in eliminating discrimination based upon
protected class status should not foreclose other efforts to improve the

does not apply to institutional defendants. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622,
638, 657 (1980).
185. See Lueders, supra note 46, at 237. The number of charges handled by the EEOC for
FY 2010 was 99,922. Charge Statistics, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforce
ment/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). Those dissatisfied with the EEOC’s resolution may
file a complaint in federal court, however, employment discrimination cases have declined as a
percentage of the federal docket (from ten to six percent) and some view the federal courts as
inhospitable to such claims. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103,
103–04 (2009).
186. See Lueders, supra note 46, at 239–41; Lippel, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that legislative
enactments are the product of political compromise and should not serve as guides for prevention
efforts).
187. See Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 275–76.
188. See Yamada, supra note 1, at 277.
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workplace and eliminate destructive and harmful behavior.189 The effect of
such a proposal on academic freedom is certainly worth considering before
enactment, but carefully drawn procedures to address workplace harassment in
the academic environment should promote academic freedom for faculty.

189. See Yamada, supra note 73, at 563–65. But see Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality?
Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1252–66 (2011)
(suggesting, inter alia, that anti-bullying laws might dilute current gender protection law and
enforce gender stereotypes).

